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Lewis’ pessimistic outlook for industrial development in what we now call
emerging markets was based on the view that developed countries allowed
access to their markets only during brief periods of prosperity since “they
then have many growing industries that can take the people displaced by
imports” (Lewis 1979). Otherwise, they act to block access to manufac-
tured imports from cheap labor countries to protect domestic workers. In
this paper, we will argue that some emerging markets in Asia have found,
perhaps by accident, a way around this fundamental obstacle to industrial
and economic development. The solution has created the basic features of
the current international monetary system. Along the way to making this
argument, we will characterize the exchange rate and other policies de-
signed to eliminate the vast underemployment in Asia as a solution to an
exhaustible resource problem. Notably, the welcoming of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) is a solution to Lewis’s conundrum in industrial develop-
ment. Finally, we will propose a view that the main features of interna-
tional ﬁnance are organized to overcome such inherent protectionism,
rather than as a solution to an intertemporal consumption problem.
3.1 International Monetary Systems Are Endogenous Solutions
Whatever are the institutions and mechanisms of the international mon-
etary system at any moment, they have emerged as solutions to a key real
economic problem of the time.
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Could the whole [development] problem be solved simply by
increasing the growth rate of manufactured exports to MDCs
[more developed countries], in substitution for primary prod-
ucts? I shall assume this cannot be done....  A l s o  I  think it
cannot be done.
—W. Arthur Lewis, 1979 Nobel Lecture
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Bureau of Economic Research.The Bretton Woods system was a top-down solution to what were per-
ceived as the crucial problems of the Depression and World War II. A deal
between the United States and the United Kingdom, its basic features
were a compromise between the conﬂicting economic interests of the two
parties. The United States viewed the competitive devaluations of the
1930s and the subsequent discriminatory trading blocs as detrimental to
stability and especially harmful to U.S. trade. A creditor country with in-
tact capital and promising exports, it was interested in currency stability
and nondiscriminatory, open trading systems. The United Kingdom was
determined not to sacriﬁce internal balance to maintain external balance.
It wanted currency ﬂexibility. With its huge sterling debt and its unbal-
anced war mobilization, it was interested also in maintaining controls and
channeling of trade within the sterling bloc. Finally, it wanted access to
oﬃcial credit in large amounts if it was to maintain ﬁxed rates. The com-
promise was to have ﬁxed exchange rates but with ﬂexibility within the
rules, a gradual lifting of controls, and access to credit as a function of
oﬃcial quotas. This basic outline of the system lasted for the next twenty-
ﬁve years.
The current system is also one of ﬁxed or heavily managed exchange
rates, with the accumulation of dollar reserves on a historically large scale,
and is based on an eﬀort to keep trade ﬂows open. However, it is an ad hoc,
bottom-up system, the sum of independent policy choices across and
within countries. But it likewise has emerged to solve the fundamental real
economic problem of our time: the emergence of 200 million underem-
ployed workers into the global industrial economy.
3.2 Revived Bretton Woods
In a series of papers, we have characterized the international monetary
system that has evolved to facilitate this development strategy in some
periphery countries as a revival of the Bretton Woods system (Dooley,
Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003a, 2004a,b,c). The revival has been con-
temporaneous with rapid deterioration of the net international investment
position of the United States, and this has raised concerns about the sta-
bility of the system.
The discomfort with the current situation was already carefully set out
ﬁve or six years ago (Mann 1999; Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 2000). The logic is
that although international capital markets were much larger and more re-
silient than in the past, they could not support a U.S. current account
deﬁcit of 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for long, let alone the
current 6 percent. Moreover, even a mild withdrawal of credit from the
United States—for example, a reduction in ﬁnancing that required a re-
turn to current account balance—would generate a very large and sudden
depreciation in the real value of the dollar. The sensitivity of real exchange
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goods markets across countries.
A related concern then and now is that the low level of private and gov-
ernment savings in the United States is generating a perverse ﬂow of world
savings to the United States. Summers (2004) has recently argued, for ex-
ample, that the single engine for world recovery, U.S. growth and U.S. ﬁs-
cal deﬁcits, is a recipe for disaster both for the United States and the rest of
the world. The global system has perversely, from the viewpoint of the text-
book theory underpinning these views, moved steadily into higher imbal-
ances. This has increased the stridency of proscriptive calls for their end or
descriptions of the dire mechanisms by which this may be achieved, as
exempliﬁed in recent papers by Goldstein and Lardy (2003, 2004a,b),
Eichengreen (2004), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004), and Roubini and Setser
(2005).
This growing chasm between what we know ought to be and what is can
be best summarized in parallel charts on ten-year Treasury inﬂation-
protected securities (10-TIPS) yields and the U.S. current account balance
(see ﬁgure 3.1). The long term real interest rate has been falling as the cur-
rent account deﬁcit has been growing into historically uncharted territory.
Our standard theory of open economy macroeconomics been wildly
wrong for ﬁve years. The data indicate that it is likely to be wrong for years
more. Of course, some day the imbalances will be reduced, allowing us to
resume teaching the standard stuﬀ with some increase in conﬁdence.
Meanwhile, we will have a decade long gap during which our accepted par-
adigm cannot come to grips with the key macroeconomic problem deﬁn-
ing the era.
We have argued that the reluctance of private investors to increase their
net claims on the United States has, as conventional analysis suggests, con-
tributed to appreciation of ﬂoating currencies such as the euro against the
dollar, but that this has not even started to force an adjustment of the U.S.
international investment position and current account ﬂows.
The reason is no mystery; governments in Asia are providing the neces-
sary ﬁnancing. The issue now is how long this can continue. The conven-
tional view is that the Asian governments can ﬁll the gap for only a short
interval and, when the wheels fall oﬀ, the adjustment costs for the world
economy will be very heavy.1 The mechanism for the disaster is familiar.
Expectations for the large exchange rate change needed to correct current
imbalances generate massive private capital ﬂows to the periphery. Capital
controls and ﬁnancial repression are no match for a determined private
sector. If inﬂows are not sterilized, the monetary base explodes and the
needed real exchange rate adjustment comes through inﬂation. Faced with
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1. See Rogoﬀ (2003). As Rogoﬀ puts it, ﬂying on one engine is easy as compared to landing
on one wheel.this unpleasant reality, central banks give up and revalue nominal ex-
change rates.
The conventional argument is a good description of the ﬁnal days of the
original Bretton Woods system. It is relevant for countries that are ready
to graduate to the center. But it ignores the fact that the system lasted for
two decades. To be sure, the original Bretton Woods system was not asked
to ﬁnance a U.S. current account deﬁcit until its closing days, but the pe-
riphery did beneﬁt from rapid growth of trade and ﬁnanced a substantial
increase in U.S. direct and long-term investments abroad. Moreover, most
governments in the periphery did not decide that the system was no longer
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Fig. 3.1 A, Ten-year TIPS yield; B, U.S. current account balancein their interests. They were forced to abandon the regime by private capi-
tal ﬂows. The erosion of the eﬀectiveness of capital controls and domestic
ﬁnancial repression that made this possible followedthe development of in-
ternational trade and domestic ﬁnancial markets, and this process took
many years.
The current version of the Bretton Woods system presents the periphery
with similar policy choices.2 We argue in the following that expansion of
the volume of trade in goods and services and the volume of two-way trade
in ﬁnancial assets is the backbone of a successful industrialization or de-
velopment strategy. If the price to be paid for this strategy includes ﬁnanc-
ing a large U.S. current account deﬁcit, governments in the periphery will
see it in their interest to provide ﬁnancing even in circumstances where
private international investors would not.
The catastrophic losses and abrupt price breaks forecast by the conven-
tional wisdom of international macroeconomics arise from a model of very
naive government behavior. In that model, periphery governments stub-
bornly maintain a distorted exchange rate until it is overwhelmed by spec-
ulative capital ﬂows. In our view, a more sensible political economy guides
governments in Asia. The objectives are the rapid mobilization of under-
employed Asian labor and the accumulation of a capital stock that will re-
main eﬃcient even after the system ends.
The mechanism that regulates the mobilization is a cross-border trans-
fer to countries like the United States that are willing to restructure their
labor markets to accommodate the rapid growth of industrial employment
in Asia. Net imbalances like those now observed for the United States may
or may not be a by-product of this system. But such imbalances are only
one of the constraints on the system and for considerable periods of time
may not be as binding a constraint as in conventional theories.
3.3 What Force Drives the Global System?
China has about 200 million unemployed or underemployed workers to
bring into the modern labor force. For political stability, there is a need for
10 to 12 million net new jobs per year in the urban centers. A growth rate
of around 8  percent has served to employ about 10 million new workers
each year. About 3 million have been in the export sector.3
Direct Investment, Rising Real Wages, and Absorption of Excess Labor 107
2. This policy has been criticized as wrongheaded in that FDI should be the source of global
ﬁnance for a deﬁcit on current account although this prescription seems to have been pulled
from out of the air. The principle behind this argument seems to be that the external accounts
should be properly balanced as a priority over the internal balance. See Goldstein and Lardy
(2003, 2004a,b). The alternative argument is that being a net capital exporter seems to work.
3. Exports generate 10 percent of value added in GDP. The export sector grows twice as fast
as the rest of the economy. So 25 percent of all growth is from the export sector. Because of a
lower capital-labor ratio than in the rest of the economy, the export sector accounts for about
30 percent of employment growth.If the world can absorb politically only the output of an additional 10
million workers per year (3 million in the export sector), then simple arith-
metic indicates that this surplus is a force for twenty years more in the
global system. If it can absorb the surplus faster, say, at a rising absolute
rate that will keep the Chinese growth rate constant at 8 percent until the
surplus is eliminated; then straightforward compounding and linearity as-
sumptions indicate that this will drive the global system ever more relent-
lessly for the next twelve years).
We do not take a stand on how long this force will drive the global sys-
tem. But twelve to twenty years has deﬁned an era for any recent interna-
tional monetary system.
3.4 Political Economy of Export Led Growth
Our analysis of government behavior has some surprising implications.
Perhaps the most important is the idea that there is a trade-oﬀbetween ob-
jectives for intertemporal trade, objectives for net international investment
positions, and objectives for growth in gross trade in goods and ﬁnancial
instruments. In the framework we develop, governments have well-deﬁned
objectives for export growth and for the pattern of international ﬁnancial
intermediation. Within limits, they are willing to ﬁnance net capital ﬂows
when net ﬂows are a by-product of this development strategy. The limits are
likely to be much less of a constraint on the international system than is
suggested by conventional analysis. Our framework, as it existed on ﬁrst
writing this paper, does not, for example, explain the source of the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcit. But it does provide an explanation for the relative will-
ingness of Asian governments to ﬁnance that deﬁcit.4
Governments care about grosstrade and capital ﬂows because both gen-
erate important externalities that are not captured by private ﬁrms and
investors. Domestic production of traded goods subjects ﬁrms to the dis-
cipline of international competition and world prices, a discipline not
imposed by distorted domestic markets for goods and services. Domestic
capital formation by foreign direct investors ﬁnanced in international cap-
ital markets bypasses distorted domestic ﬁnancial markets. A sensible de-
velopment strategy provides strong incentives for foreign direct investors
to utilize unemployed domestic labor to produce for export markets. The
emerging market is, in eﬀect, borrowing the right relative prices and ﬁnan-
cial incentives from world markets to guide capital formation during a
transition to full participation in the world economy.
But, as Lewis suggested, access to import markets comes at a price. Pen-
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4. We have argued elsewhere (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber [2004b]) that the un-
balanced risks accruing from FDI ﬂows require collateral on a large scale to support the gross
cross-border positions. The current account surpluses are the only means to generate the col-
lateral.etration of markets in industrial countries will generate a protectionist re-
sponse. We do not argue that imports cause unemployment in the import-
ing country, but it is clear to us that industrialization of the periphery re-
quires a fundamental restructuring of the labor force in the center. While
this creates tremendous aggregate beneﬁts for both countries, established
industries and their workers in the center are displaced. No country has
found a workable way to compensate its own losers. So a surplus must be
generated and properly allocated to provide additional incentives to over-
come protection. In short, we believe in gains from trade but also believe
that gains from trade are not enough to insure that mutually beneﬁcial
trade will automatically occur. Our conjecture is that this distortion alone
is suﬃcient to keep labor in the periphery in domestic zero marginal prod-
uct activities.
The recent reduction of private capital inﬂows to the United States and
the appreciation of the euro and other ﬂoating currencies provide an op-
portunity for ﬁxed- or managed-rate emerging markets to replace Euro-
pean exports to the United States without changing the rate at which U.S.
labor markets absorb total imports. Even if governments weigh the same
risks of ﬁnancing net deﬁcits as do private investors, governments also see
beneﬁts of accelerating their development strategies. It follows that the
United States will, other things equal, be able to maintain larger increases
in its net international debt over time.
3.5 Exhaustible Resources
The economics underlying the current international monetary system is
best viewed through the lens of an exhaustible resource model. The ex-
haustible resource is the pool of Asian labor that is underemployed by in-
dustrial country standards. Left underemployed, it is politically dangerous
and socially costly. Once employed, it produces a stream of product mar-
ginally valued at the global real wage and contributes to social and politi-
cal stability. So the government would like to employ labor in the industrial
sector as quickly as possible. The government also wants to insure that at
the end of the transition period the capital stock should be capable, when
combined with domestic labor paid the world real wage, of producing goods
going forward that are competitive with those produced in other countries.
This is a crucial constraint: make-work projects or great leaps forward will
not do because the history of development has shown repeatedly that this
is the way to end-game crisis and zero-value real capital.
There are two reasons that employment is increasingly costly in the rate
of employment growth. First, we make the usual assumption that invest-
ment installation costs rise in the rate of investment over time, the usual
bottleneck argument. It follows that a more rapid adjustment requires a
greater cost of capital per worker.
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displaced workers in the importing country. Again, it seems likely that the
adjustment costs in the country restructuring its labor market are increas-
ing in the rate of import penetration. Put another way, a larger piece of the
new product stream must be paid to the importing countrythe faster is the ab-
sorption of the unemployed pool.
In the current global system, beneﬁts are shared with importing coun-
tries by initially giving foreign capital access to Asian labor at a low do-
mestic real wage relative to the world real wage. This gives the capitalist
excess proﬁts for some time period and provides the resources for the
capitalist to utilize to keep home country import markets open. The trick
is to set the real wage (real exchange rate) low enough and to adjust it grad-
ually upward to the expected real wage in the rest of the world until the ex-
cess labor pool is exhausted, all at a minimum cost.
The optimal strategy for the government is to set the initial wage and the
rate of change in the wage in order to employ fully the stock of unemployed
labor at a minimum cost.
Consider ﬁrst the rate of change for the real wage. An additional unit of
labor employed provides a nonnegative yield to the government b. A unit
of unemployed labor costs the government a yield of –r. The yield b can be
thought of as tax revenue or political support for the government. The
yield –r might be transfers to the unemployed or political opposition.
The incentive with which the government sweetens the provision of la-
bor to investors is the present value of the diﬀerence between the domestic
real wage and the world real wage. Suppose the government kept this pres-
ent value constant for two consecutive time periods. A constant incentive
generates a constant ﬂow of new employment. If the incentive in the ﬁrst
period was set slightly higher than in the second period, less unemployed
labor will be carried over into the second period. The carryover is costly, so
a constant incentive cannot be optimal. The government can get the same
increase in employment at a lower cost by frontloading the adjustment.
Because it is in the government’s interest to reduce the incentive over
time, the present value of the sequence of market wages must be expected
to rise. While there are some complicated interactions between marginal
costs of extraction and the optimal adjustment path in any real world ap-
plication, the result that the wage rises monotonically to the equilibrium
level is quite general (Devarajan and Fisher 1981).
Paths AB and CD in ﬁgure 3.2satisfy this rate of change condition. Path
AB starts from w1, a relatively high initial real wage, and increases at the
optimal rate. Path CD begins with w2and rises at the same rate. The full so-
lution to the Hotelling (1931) problem requires that the government sets
the initial wage so that the initial stock of labor is employed when the do-
mestic wage rises to the world wage. Clearly, a lower initial real wage path
CD generates more total employment over the interval from t0to T2as com-
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increases as the initial wage declines and only one initial wage fully em-
ploys the initial labor supply.
It also follows that a country with a very large stock of labor to employ
will want to set a real exchange rate that appears to be grossly undervalued
by conventional measures.5 Moreover, the adjustment period is deter-
mined by the equilibrium adjustment path and, other things equal, is
longer the larger the initial stock of labor to be employed. Without gov-
ernment coordination, individual workers could not internalize the bene-
ﬁts from rapid capital accumulation and open export markets. They would
therefore demand higher wages and live with slower employment growth
and a longer adjustment period.
We can summarize this section as follows. The optimal exchange rate
and inﬂation policy are derived conceptually from the exhaustible resource
problem. For a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, only one initial real exchange
rate is optimal, and only one rate of inﬂation generates the optimal path for
the real wage over time. The length of the adjustment period is determined,
and at its end the following conditions hold:
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Fig. 3.2 Real wages and adjustment
5. It follows that the shadow exchange rate, that is, the exchange rate that would prevail if
the government set the rate at its optimal level to a point in time but then withdrew from the
market, would always be above the optimal exchange rate. In this sense, the optimal exchange
rate might appear to be undervalued relative to the shadow rate.• The domestic real wage equals the world real wage in the manufactur-
ing sector.
• The initial pool of surplus labor is employed.
• The capital stock has increased to match the world capital or labor ra-
tio in manufacturing.
• The political costs of adjusting displaced labor and capital in the im-
porting country have been compensated. This co-opts attempts to use
commercial policy to freeze out the exports that are vital to the devel-
opment policy.
3.6 An Indeterminacy: Adjust Nominal Wages or Nominal
Exchange Rates?
The optimal adjustment path for the real wage allows the authorities to
choose a path for the nominal wage rate or the nominal exchange rate, but
not both independently. In fact, Asian authorities use both techniques. For
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, the central bank manages the inﬂation rate in
order to regulate the dollar value of domestic wages and prices. In this case,
we would expect wage inﬂation to be above that in the center so that do-
mestic real wages rise over time. The alternative would be to set domestic
wage and price inﬂation at or below that in the center and then allow the
nominal exchange rate to appreciate over time but at a controlled rate.
As long as private market participants understand that policy is driven
by the objectives set out in the preceding—the optimal path for the real
wage rate—the same pattern of real private capital ﬂows and trade account
will be generated by either a ﬁxed or managed-ﬂoat exchange rate arrange-
ment. From the balance-of-payments accounting identity, it follows that
the path of real and nominal oﬃcial intervention is invariant to whether a
ﬁxed-rate or managed-ﬂoat regime is chosen.Those who argue the necessity
of switching to a managed appreciation because of the large accumulation
of oﬃcial reserves are missing the basic policy problem and its resolution.
Moreover, switching from ﬁxed to managed ﬂoating, perhaps in the face of
political pressure from the center, would not alter the real nature of the
transition.
3.7 The Transfer to Foreign Capital
The regime set out so far encourages capital formation in export indus-
tries and makes room for this new investment in the domestic market. But
it does not suggest that nonresident direct investors are the best placed to
do the investing. Recall, however, that the investor has to expect that the
foreign markets for exports remain open and that the political costs of dis-
placed workers in the importing countries must be compensated.
A transparent but unrealistic example will help make the point. Suppose
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on a project-by-project basis. The gap between the domestic and world real
wage would then be captured by selected capitalists.6 Moreover, the gov-
ernment could lend through domestic balance sheets to the direct investor
and ﬁnance this by sales of securities to the domestic market. The govern-
ment can reduce the political costs to foreign governments associated with
rapid export growth by allocating some of this capital to foreign investors
that are adept at penetrating countries that allow the rapid growth of im-
ports. In the present context, with the United States absorbing much of the
exports, this allocation would go to those FDI investors who can push
goods into the United States. This provides an economic rent until the con-
vergence of real wages at T, which is not competed away because entry into
FDI is rationed by the Chinese government.
The foreign investors then become a well-ﬁnanced and eﬀective lobby to
counteract the resistance to the restructuring of the U.S. labor force away
from import substitutes. The foreign investors need not be U.S. nationals
in order to inﬂuence U.S. trade policy. Prasad and Wei (2005) argue that be-
cause most direct investment into China does not come directly from the
United States, direct investment could not be a signiﬁcant force in keeping
U.S. markets open. It is diﬃcult to identify the nationality of multilateral
ﬁrms; for example, we do not believe that the Virgin Islands are the third
largest direct investors in China. But more important Asian direct in-
vestors in China, including Japan, Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion (SAR), and Korea Taiwan, which account for the bulk of direct in-
vestment in China, have a long and successful history of penetration of
U.S. markets. Multinationals from these countries may be more skilled lob-
byists than U.S.-based corporations.
Each time a worker is matched with foreign capital, the direct investor
gets a beneﬁt equal to the discounted value of the wage diﬀerential plus the
normal return to capital. The excess returns are implicitly paid by the Chi-
nese workers accepting the low but rising real wage.
But perhaps this method of local intermediation is too transparent and
diﬃcult politically. Instead, the government could sell the same domestic
security mentioned previously but, rather than make a loan to a direct in-
vestor, purchase international reserves. The foreign investor then has to
borrow at his own normal cost of funds and then buy yuan to make the in-
vestment. Part of the subsidy to the foreigner is then given to borrowers in
reserve currency countries and part to the FDI investor in the form of rents
from access to low real wage labor.
Politically, this is perhaps better because there is an arms-length rela-
tionship between the government and the ﬁnancing of the foreign investor.
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6. We refer to foreign investors and not foreign direct investors because in this example they
are ﬁnanced by Chinese saving intermediated through domestic balance sheets.With this more competitive mechanism, we would expect that the surplus
generated by access to low wages in China would be absorbed by adjust-
ment costs. In this case, direct investors from countries with open import
markets might enjoy a competitive advantage over other foreign and do-
mestic investors because they can more eﬀectively mobilize proﬁts to make
transfer payments to their fellow residents.
At this point we do not understand well the mechanism that allocates in-
vestment in the export sector, its proﬁtability, or the distribution of those
proﬁts.7 It is also quite possible that direct investment is restricted, or the
risk that the regime might end prematurely requires excess proﬁts in order
to insure entry. The net proﬁtability of direct investment is an important in-
gredient in the evolution of net international investments positions during
the transition. Data on proﬁtability of direct investment in China is anec-
dotal at best. We can make a reasonable guess about the gap between the
real wage and marginal product of labor, but we do not have much infor-
mation about the distribution of the implied surplus. This is an important
topic for further research.
3.8 What about the Accumulating Balance Sheet Positions?
Headline numbers for reserve accumulation and the U.S. current ac-
count deﬁcits seem to suggest that the main end-game problem is the ac-
cumulated net international investment position of the center and the pe-
riphery. But net positions are the diﬀerence between two much larger gross
assets and liabilities. Just as in the original Bretton Woods System, oﬃcial
intervention, that is, large oﬃcial capital outﬂows from the periphery, are
largely associated with private capital inﬂows to the periphery. In our view,
the ﬁnancial intermediation and the capital gains and losses generated will
substantially mitigate problems associated with the net international in-
vestment positions generated by export led growth.
At the end of the transition period, Asian governments will hold a large
stock of U.S. treasury and other securities on which it has earned a rela-
tively low but positive rate of return. It will also have incurred a large stock
of liabilities to domestic claimants. But at the end of the game, both of
these will carry the same international interest rate. The United States will
hold a large stock of direct investment that pays the world equity rate go-
ing forward but that has paid a much higher rate during the adjustment in-
terval.
It may be instructive to take another look at the end of the original Bret-
ton Woods system with these two points in mind. The United States did not
run large trade deﬁcits leading up to the 1971 to 1973 crisis that ended the
regime. The balance-of-payments deﬁcit that observers focused on at the
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7. See Razin and Sadka (2002) for an interesting discussion of the allocation of rents.time was the liquidity balance, a concept that put short-term capital in-
ﬂows below the line. As Depres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966) pointed
out in their celebrated letter to the Economist, this concept of a deﬁcit ig-
nores the legitimate role of ﬁnancial intermediation in international ﬁnan-
cial arrangements. To be sure, ﬁnancial intermediation can lead to insta-
bility and crises. But the problem is much more subtle, and the lessons from
countries that have run large and persistent current account deﬁcits may
not be of much use in evaluating the new Bretton Woods.
3.9 The Key Role of Financial Repression
A key to this regime is the ability of the government to repress real wages
for an extended period of time. In our framework, this is equivalent to con-
trolling the rate of inﬂation and the nominal exchange rate. Given a foreign
rate of inﬂation and an international interest rate, this requires that the link
between domestic and international interest rates be broken. In our view,
China has more than adequate controls on domestic and international ﬁ-
nancial transactions to make this possible.
• Purchases of international bonds are strictly controlled.
• State-owned or controlled banks provide all the claims available for
domestic savers.
• The government sets the interest rate on these bank liabilities and ra-
tions bank credit to the private sector.
• Growth in the foreign part of the monetary base is determined by the
current account surplus plus targeted net direct investment inﬂows.
In this repressed domestic ﬁnancial system, growth in domestic credit
from the banking system is a residual, that is, the diﬀerence between de-
sired money base growth, (determined by the desired rate of inﬂation), the
growth in the demand for money and the growth in the foreign part of the
base.
Domestic savings not purchased by the banking system are absorbed by
sales of domestic treasury or central bank securities to households and
ﬁrms. Note that as long as the interest rate that clears this market is not
above the return on U.S. treasury securities or other forms of investing the
reserves, the government can absorb domestic savings and intermediate
into foreign bonds while booking an accounting proﬁt.
The government rations credit to the private sector by forcing the banks
to buy government securities through liquidity and reserve requirements
and then rations the remaining credit to the private sector at ﬁxed lending
rates. This, of course, sets up strong incentives for private lenders and bor-
rowers to go oﬀshore or to alternative domestic intermediaries. We assume
that the government is an eﬀective counterforce to such ﬁnancial innova-
tion for the requisite amount of time.
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The macromanagement problem for the government in implementing
this policy is daunting but simple enough to set out. In pursing the em-
ployment objective, a distorted real exchange rate will create imbalances in
the economy that require an additional policy instrument. As noted previ-
ously, the bottom line is that the government must be able to manage the
domestic real interest rate throughout the adjustment period to keep the
domestic economy in balance. The good news is that the problems are large
but diminish over time.
To make this argument, assume the economy, aside from the 200 million,
is in full employment equilibrium with eﬀective capital controls, no initial
net international investment position, and an exchange rate that balances
trade. To set the problem in motion, now imagine that 200 million unem-
ployed people appear from the provinces. As discussed previously, the path
for the real exchange rate that solves the absorption problem involves a sud-
den real depreciation that is gradually eliminated. The exchange rate path
that solves the absorption problem therefore subsidizes exports relative to
imports, and the trade balance initially moves from balance to surplus.8
The initial current account surplus must equal the amount by which do-
mestic (government plus private) savings exceed domestic absorption. It
follows that a rise in the domestic interest rate is needed to reduce absorp-
tion relative to savings. But what happens to the interest rate that insures
internal balance over time?
During the adjustment period, the trade surplus as a share of GDP will
decline and may move into deﬁcit as the real exchange rate appreciates and
domestic income grows more rapidly than foreign income. A surplus on the
service account will appear and grow as net asset accumulation generates
net capital income. But the overall current account as a percent of domes-
tic GDP will fall for any reasonable set of parameters. It follows that the
domestic interest rate will fall over time as a smaller share of domestic ab-
sorption is crowded out by net transfers abroad. This mitigates the interest
diﬀerential pressure on capital controls.
3.11 Sterilization and Inﬂation
The relevant capital ﬂow problem in the face of expected revaluation is
large private capital inﬂows. If private capital inﬂows augment the mone-
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8. An important mitigating factor is that adjustments in commercial policy are likely to en-
courage imports. For example, the initial condition for China is a large gap between the eﬀec-
tive exchange rate for imports and exports. In fact, China has not run a large overall trade sur-
plus to date. In part, this probably reﬂects large declines in tariﬀs associated with ascension
to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In part, this also arises because China has been an
assembly center for the rest of East Asia, with component imports representing an imported
fraction of ﬁnished exports.tary base and, in turn, increase domestic inﬂation, real wage growth will be
too rapid, and the transition will be too short to accomplish the govern-
ment’s objectives. However, if capital inﬂows are sterilized, and if domestic
ﬁnancial repression allows the government to ﬁnance reserve creation by
issuing low interest domestic securities, the inﬂationary impact is elimi-
nated.
This is an empirical issue. Capital controls and ﬁnancial repression do
not last forever, but neither does the regime we are describing. We simply
observe that to date, Asian governments have been very successful in hit-
ting aggressive inﬂation targets. In the case of China, for example, some
observers have suggested that overheating and an inﬂationary spiral are al-
ready underway. In our view, that is more of a prediction than an observa-
tion. Time will tell, but we would point out that there are many reasons why
inﬂation may have increased in recent months. In general, a growth rate of
8  percent has not generated inﬂation in China. In our view, increases in
reserve requirements last year, a form of sterilization, have already reduced
the growth in money and credit. Moreover, this has been accomplished
with no increase in administered interest rates.
If the capital account is liberalized, expectations of appreciation that are
a central feature of the regime discussed in the following will generate cap-
ital inﬂows. Moreover, market-determined domestic interest rates would
make sterilization expensive, and so inﬂation would be the eventual result.
But we do not expect opening of the capital account or deregulation of do-
mestic interest rates. It follows that the economic linkages between ex-
change rate policy and inﬂation clearly relevant for capital account coun-
tries do not now exist, and we do not expect them to materialize for many
years.
3.12 Overheating? A Diversion into the Facts
Because many have argued that this system must end soon from in-
evitable overheating in China and East Asia, it is useful to consider brieﬂy
whether this phenomenon has yet materialized.9
We can infer that the Chinese economy is growing faster than its poten-
tial because raw materials prices are rising, energy use is rising faster than
supply, and wages are rising. But growth is not fast enough to drive con-
sumer prices higher—and almost all items in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) have free market pricing. Only food and housing prices are rising
much at all—about 5 percent yoy each. Prices for clothing, furnishings,
health care, transportation, and communications are falling. Nonfood
CPI inﬂation was 0.8 percent in January, 2005, a six-month low.
As in previous episodes of high global commodity prices, raw materials
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9. This view has shown up in testimony by Alan Greenspan (2005) and has been expressed
most forcefully by Goldstein and Lardy (2003, 2004a,b) and Roubini and Setser (2005).prices are rising much faster than producer prices for manufactured goods
or consumer goods and margins are being squeezed. Recently, ﬁrms seem
to have a little more pricing power than in the past, but lately even those
downstream prices have softened. (See ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4.)
China’s price experience is hardly atypical. In the United States and else-
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Fig. 3.4 Producer prices in China, 1997–2005
Fig. 3.3 Consumer prices in China, 1994–2005where, producer prices are also rising signiﬁcantly faster than consumer
prices. Higher raw materials costs are compressing margins in many in-
dustries and pose an upward risk to consumer price inﬂation, if ﬁrms can
pass on higher costs. Compared to China, there is even stronger evidence
that the U.S. economy is growing suﬃciently fast relative to potential that
inﬂation risks are mounting. Prices for all categories of consumer goods
(except perhaps apparel) are rising, and nonfood inﬂation in the United
States is above 3 percent, versus less than 1 percent in China. A good case
can be made for the view that inﬂation going forward will be more of a
problem in the United States than in China. (See ﬁgure 3.5.)
3.13 Is the Renminbi (RMB) Peg Causing Monetary Instability?
The crux of the overheating argument is that China’s large external sur-
pluses and reserve accumulation threaten monetary stability. Therefore, it
is in China’s own interest that the RMB be allowed to appreciate so that
this source of inﬂationary pressure can be relieved. But money supply
growth has been slowing since early 2004, while foreign exchange inter-
vention rose to record highs. Also, going farther back, money supply
growth surged in 2000 before China had to intervene much at all. In sum,
this argument ignores the fact that China’s money supply is not aﬀected
much by the increase in reserves: sterilization is not particularly diﬃcult.
Reserves rose $207 billion in 2004, after rising $162 billion in 2003
(adding back in the $45 billion transferred to domestic banks). In 2004, the
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Fig. 3.5 U.S. CPI and PPI, 1997–2005People’s Bank of China’s (PBOC) net foreign assets rose RMB1.58 trillion
($191 billion), while net domestic assets fell RMB980 billion ($118 billion).
So 62 percent of the reserve increase was sterilized. That is a much smaller
amount than most other central banks in Asia, which are averaging 80 per-
cent to 90 percent sterilization. But it is a reasonable amount. China is
targeting nominal GDP growth of about 12 percent (i.e., about 8 percent
growth with about 4 percent inﬂation, neither of which are hard targets)
and wanted broad money growth of about 17 percent in 2004, the oﬃcial
target at the beginning of the year. Reserve money growth was 11.4 percent
yoy (December to December) in 2004, and M2 growth was 14.5 percent.
For 2005, the M2 growth target is about 15 percent. In the ﬁrst quarter of
2005, the GDP growth rate was 9.5 percent while inﬂation was 2.8 percent
yoy. M2 growth was 14 percent yoy at the end of March, with loan growth
at 13 percent yoy, both below oﬃcial targets.
From August 2002 to February 2005, the PBOC has issued RMB1.3 tril-
lion ($157 billion) in central bank bonds to mop up excess liquidity. Foreign
exchange reserves rose $367 billion during that period. These bonds ac-
counted for 14 percent of the central bank’s liabilities. Far from having to
raise interest rates in order to be able to sterilize fx inﬂows, interest rates on
banks’ excess reserves have been cut twice since 2001. Bond and repo yields
are volatile but essentially directionless (one-year repo ended 2004 66bps
below end-2003 levels). The PBOC raised deposit rates by 25bps in October
2004 to start the process of bringing real rates back to neutral levels.
Until December 2004, the PBOC issued three-month, six-month and
twelve-month bills (zero-coupon) for sterilization purposes, but almost all
at the twelve-month term. These are traded, and the yield on the three-
month bonds peaked at 3.5 percent in early November, which was a spike
after the policy rate hike. By the end of the year, the yield was down to 3.2
percent. Following the PBOC’s decision to cut the interest rate on excess
reserves (by 72bps), the three-month yield is now around 2.2 percent. In
December 2004, the PBOC started issuing three-year bonds. The yield on
the ﬁxed-rate bonds started at 4.1 percent, and issues at par in March had
a coupon of 3.3 percent. For comparison, the yield on U.S. three-month 
T-bills was about 2 percent in November, 2.2 percent in December 2004,
and 2.8 percent in March 2005. The yield on three-year notes was 3.2 per-
cent in December 2004 and about 4 percent in March 2004. The PBOC
would gain on the carry by holding middle-term notes.10 (See ﬁgures 3.6,
3.7, 3.8, and 3.9.)
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10. Central banks in Asia earned between 4 percent and 5 percent last year on their re-
serves. They tend not to buy thirty-day paper; rather, they buy two-year, ﬁve-year, and ten-
year bonds, plus some subsovereign paper. Generally, the accounting cost of ﬁnancing re-
serves is much less than interest earnings: a large part is funded by sales of central bank paper,
but the rest is funded by required reserves bearing interest of less than 2 percent. So Asian
central banks earn a signiﬁcant positive carry.3.14 Is the Rest of Asia Overheating?
Most countries saw a large increase in foreign exchange reserves in 2004.
Combined Asia-10 reserves rose from $1.22 trillion to $1.59 trillion. In
comparison, Japan’s reserves rose $85bn in the ﬁrst quarter and then only
$15bn thereafter as they stopped intervening.
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Fig. 3.6 China: FX reserves accumulation, 1997–2004
Fig. 3.7 China: RMB real eﬀective exchange rate (dbREER)
Sources: CEIC Financial Times Data Service and Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research.From the following charts, if intervention was going to be a problem, it
would appear likely that this problem would be most acute in Malaysia,
Singapore, China, and Taiwan. (See ﬁgures 3.10 and 3.11.)
But just as China has had no diﬃculty managing its reserves inﬂow, so,
too, elsewhere we see no real (political issues in Korea aside) diﬃculty with
intervention and sterilization. Central banks have raised interest rates
more slowly than in the United States, if at all, and bond yields have re-
mained stable (rising slightly in China and India by about 125bps), while
yields fell in the United States. Korea has been the only country where in-
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Fig. 3.8 China: Money supply growth
Fig. 3.9 China: Real one-year deposit ratetervention has been problematic because parliament opposed it. But even
there, all of the reserve accumulation was sterilized in 2004. Monetary pol-
icy has probably been and remains too tight, not too loose. Net foreign as-
sets of the ten Asian monetary authorities rose $359 billion in 2004, but
reserve money rose only $111 billion—almost 70 percent of the reserve
increase was sterilized through a reduction in net domestic assets in order
to keep money supply growth under control. (See ﬁgures 3.12 and 3.13.)
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Fig. 3.10 Foreign exchange reserves in Asia
Fig. 3.11 Change in reserves in 2004
Sources: CEIC Financial Times Data Service and Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research.3.15 Conclusions
What makes this perpetual motion machine run is, of course, the as-
sumed zero (actually negative) product of the pool of excess labor that we
are implicitly associating with the outcome of a market-determined real
exchange rate and allocation of domestic and international savings. This
provides a free lunch that everyone can share through current Asian poli-
cies.
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Fig. 3.12 Foreign exchange reserves/broad money
Fig. 3.13 Change in reserves in 2004/change in broad money
Sources: CEIC Financial Times Data Service and Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research.With plausible rates of accumulation and returns, the transition to the
new steady state need not imply a large continuing net transfer. So the sys-
tem can end with a smooth adjustment. The government of China, for ex-
ample, would have emplaced a more productive capital stock and will have
managed to employ 200 million people in world-level wage jobs. The
United States will own a nice chunk of the Chinese capital stock and will
have made a ﬁne excess return during its accumulation. There are even mu-
tually oﬀsetting cross-border claims against each other that can serve as es-
crow against conﬁscation.11
During the adjustment period, many dimensions of this development
program are distorted in the periphery. But one thing that is not distorted
is the knowledge that at the end of the transition, capital invested in traded-
goods industries will have to compete on an equal basis with capital in-
vested in other countries. We see no practical alternative to imposing this
discipline on an emerging market and, at the same time, accelerating the
absorption of a large and politically dangerous pool of labor. The feasibil-
ity of maintaining an undervalued exchange rate through monetary policy
and controls on domestic and international capital markets for a long time
can, of course, be questioned. But this is an empirical question. At the mo-
ment we do not see a mechanism in the case of many Asian countries for
signiﬁcant circumvention of their ﬁnancial arrangements and regulations.
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Comment Shang-Jin Wei
This paper by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber is the third in a four-
paper series that the authors have written on international monetary sys-
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Shang-Jin Wei is an advisor and head of the Trade Unit at the International Monetary
Fund, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and director of the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s Working Group on the Chinese Economy.tem.1 This is a highly successful series judged by the attention it has gener-
ated. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber have termed their theory a re-
vived Bretton Woods system. An alternative label one might fashion is a
giant communist-capitalist conspiracy theory. Here is how the conspiracy
works:
On the communist or the Chinese side,
1. There is a desire to create 20 to 30 million manufacturing jobs per
year.
2. This conﬂicts with a second feature of the economy: an ineﬃcient do-
mestic ﬁnancial system that could not convert the national savings into
productive investment.
The strategy is (a) promoting rapid export expansion, especially into the
U.S. market by welcoming FDI, especially those from the United States
by (b) using a systematically undervalued domestic currency, the RMB or
the yuan, and by (c) channeling the trade surpluses back into the United
States, buying and accumulating low-interest U.S. securities, especially
government bonds.
The use of FDI serves two purposes, according to Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau and Garber. First, it bypasses the ineﬃcient domestic system in
China. Second, by oﬀering high returns to the U.S. multinational ﬁrms,
these ﬁrms can be induced to be a counterweight to the protectionist forces
in the United States against the rise of imports from China.
The purpose of a supposedly deliberately undervalued exchange rate is
self-evident. So is the purpose of channeling foreign exchange reserve back
to the United States.
On the capitalist or the U.S. side,
1. The United States maintains a large current account deﬁcit vis-à-vis
China. The two elements of the conspiracy are that the large U.S. direct in-
vestment in China, together with the large U.S. current account deﬁcit, are
collectively termed total return swap by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and
Garber (2004c).
2. American households ﬁnd it attractive to accept or tolerate the Chi-
nese model of growth as they are enjoying lower interest rates in terms of
cheaper mortgages or are generally consuming beyond their means.
3. The U.S. government is willing to accept the Chinese model because
it needs Chinese foreign exchange to ﬁnance public debt, the Iraq War, and
so on.
A key prediction of the Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber hypothe-
sis is that such conspiracy can last for another ten to ﬁfteen years because
it can maintain enough political support on both sides of the Paciﬁc.
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1. The series of papers are Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004a,b,c).Like all intriguing theories, there are certainly elements of the theory
that seem to be well supported by facts.
Elements of Plausibility
1. The Chinese government desires to create 20 to 30 million new jobs
each year.
2. The Chinese domestic ﬁnancial system is very ineﬃcient. In fact, in a
paper with Boyreau-Debray (Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2005), I have doc-
umented various ineﬃciencies in the system. For example, if one were to
compute marginal products of capital by province, and if one expects that
capital to ﬂow to most productive activities, then the marginal product of
capital (MPKs) would be equalized in a steady state or positively corre-
lated with MPK during the transition. Instead, we ﬁnd that capital inﬂow
across regions tends to be negatively correlated with MPK. In other words,
capital in China systematically goes to less-productive regions. To under-
stand this puzzling pattern, we have decomposed the capital inﬂow into
those through state budget or state-owned banks and those by private in-
vestment and FDI. It turns out the peculiar negative association applies
only to the allocation of capital through the state budget or state banks. Be-
cause the ﬁnancial system is heavily dominated by the state, the entire sys-
tem is not conducive to channel national savings into the most productive
investment.
3. China welcomes FDI and, in fact, oﬀers not just national treatment,
but supernational treatment.
4. Chinese exports have been expanded at a very fast rate.
5. China channels much of its cumulative current account surplus in
low-yield U.S. government securities.
Elements of Less Plausibility
1. Most FDI in China does not come from the United States.2 Half of
them come from Hong Kong. The U.S. share is about 10 percent. On the
ﬂip side, the United States has more FDI in several other countries than it
does in China. Given the relative lack of prominence of U.S. companies in
China, the argument that U.S. companies would serve as a very eﬀective
counterweight to the protectionist force in the United States becomes
weaker than it ﬁrst appears.
Hong Kong has more direct investment in China than the United States.
It arguably has less recourse than the United States in the event of a Chi-
nese default on its investment. So the need for a collateral should be bigger
than the U.S. multinationals. Yes, it has run a trade surplus against China
every year since 1980.
Taiwan has about as much direct investment in China as the United
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2. The following discussion draws on Prasad and Wei (2005).States. Yet, unlike the United States, it has run a trade surplus against
China consistently throughout the 1990s and into this millennium.
2. What about the possibility that the United States collects the collat-
eral on behalf of multinational ﬁrms from all countries? This may be im-
portant precisely because collaterals in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other
small economies may not be credible; the People’s Liberation Army may
overrun them. A necessary condition for this story to work is that in the
event of a Chinese default, investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other
economies could go to the United States to ask for compensation in the
form of getting a slice of China’s foreign exchange reserve. This scenario
doesn’t seem very plausible. In addition, Japan, a large, developed country,
has about as much direct investment in China as the United States. Yet it
also runs a trade surplus.
3. While the Chinese exchange rate is likely to be undervalued today, it
was not always so over the lifetime of the eleven-year-old dollar peg sys-
tem. In fact, during much of the 1990s, black market data suggest that the
Chinese currency were overvalued rather than undervalued. Also, during
1997 to 1999, there was tremendous pressure in China to devalue yuan. Yet
the government chose not to. In any case, the Chinese did allow its currency
to appreciate by 2.1 percent on July 21, 2005. These observations do not ﬁt
very well with the conspiracy theory that a deliberately undervalued ex-
change rate has been an integral and consistent development strategy of
China.
4. The U.S. Congress does not seem to buy into the conspiracy theory as
evidenced by intense recent pressure to get the Chinese to revalue their cur-
rency.
5. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber’s colleagues at the Deutsche
Bank do not appear to buy into the their conspiracy theory as they are re-
ported to speculate on possible Chinese revaluation from time to time.
Summary
The Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber hypothesis has enough
plausible elements to make it intriguing to ponder. At the same time, there
are important parts of the story that do not appear to ﬁt the facts.
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